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Introduction
Throughout  the  past  decades,  mainstream  parties  in  Western  Europe  have  increasingly
become challenged by new parties of various ideological kinds. Notable examples are green
parties and parties of the populist radical right (PRR). A substantial number of these parties
solidified  their  position  within  parliamentary  arenas  and  some  have  even  succeeded  in
securing  executive  power.  Many  party  systems  in  post-communist  European  countries,
meanwhile, were unstable after their transitions to democracy, and a large number of parties
entered (and disappeared from) the political  scene.  In many of  these countries  one could
nevertheless observe the establishment of mainstream camps that dominated politics in the
first  decade  after  communism (Pop-Eleches  2010).  Towards  the  end  of  the  1990s,  these
mainstream camps were challenged by parties on the fringes of the political system, but also
by more centrist  anti-establishment parties with a more elusive appeal of ‘newness’ (Sikk
2011; Hanley and Sikk 2014).      
The  rise  of  various  kinds  of  new  parties  indicates  that  previously  dominant
mainstream parties  lost  the  backing  of  a  substantial  share  of  the  electorate.  This  is  not
necessarily problematic, since it might demonstrate the adaptive capacity of representative
democracies to incorporate new issues and demands. Yet, if new parties cannot live up to
expectations and if established parties fail to respond to new demands, this could feed into
more widespread political dissatisfaction or apathy. The risk of disappointment is particularly
great if parties that challenge the mainstream enter office, but fail to redeem their pledges.    
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This study intends to contribute to a closer understanding of the conditions underlying
the electoral survival and demise of ‘challenger parties’ after their first term in office. The
central  puzzle  is  why  some  of  these  parties  are  able  to  survive  reasonably  well  in  the
subsequent parliamentary election, while others fail to shield themselves from being gobbled
up by their coalition partners or other electoral rivals. By means of a systematic comparison
of 25 newly governing challenger parties across Europe this study will add to the literature in
several  ways.  First  of  all,  it  will  extend  the  scope  beyond Western  Europe  by including
challengers from post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the
analysis focuses more explicitly than existing larger-N comparative studies on the agency of
the newly governing challenger parties in office. Although small-N and single case studies
have stressed the importance of agential  conditions in relation to the electoral survival or
demise  of  newly governing parties,  an  assessment  of  such conditions  is  often missing in
comparative  studies  with  a  broader  scope.  This  study involves  a  qualitative  appraisal  of
individual  parties’ performances  in  office  as  well  as  a  more  data-oriented  cross-national
analysis.  Since  the  conditions  underlying  the  electoral  performance  of  newly  governing
challenger parties are unlikely to be uniform across all cases, the study makes use of fuzzy set
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) techniques, which can demonstrate this ‘causal
complexity’.  
The following section first discusses the main types of newly governing challenger
parties that are included in this study. The paper then discusses the analytical framework and
the selection of explanatory conditions. It subsequently touches on the operationalisation of
these conditions  and the data  collection.  The remaining sections  present  the findings  and
discuss the results. The findings show that surviving challengers did not necessarily leave a
great impression in office in terms of policy effectiveness. However, in most cases they were
characterised by a higher degree of organisational cohesion and rootedness than their  less
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successful  counterparts,  including  many  new  anti-establishment  parties  from Central  and
Eastern Europe.  
Newly governing challenger parties
Extant academic contributions investigating the electoral fate of newly governing parties often
focused on parties of a certain ideological kind, such as green parties, the radical left or the
radical  right  (e.g.  Müller  Rommel  and Poguntke  2002;  Dunphy and Bale  2011;  Heinisch
2003; Akkerman and De Lange 2012; Zaslove 2012). This study has a broader focus as it is
interested  in  all  newly  governing  parties  characterised  by  a  criticism  of  mainstream
ideologies, or a more general anti-establishment discourse. These are here described using the
term  ‘challenger  parties’.  Other  potentially  suitable  concepts  are  discarded  for  various
reasons.2 It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  the  concept  ‘challenger  party’ is  given  a  different
meaning  in  several  other  accounts.  Thomas  Rochon,  for  instance,  distinguished  between
‘mobilisers’  and  ‘challengers’,  the  former  type  of  party  mobilising  support  with  a  new
ideology, the latter on the basis of an existing cleavage (Rochon 1985). In this study, both
types of parties could fit under the ‘challenger’ label.3 De Vries and Hobolt, on the other hand,
2 For instance, this study does not use the concept of anti-political establishment (APE) parties. 
Schedler’s (1996) and Abedi’s (2004) definitions of APE parties overlap considerably with definitions 
of populism, due to their emphasis on a fundamental divide between ‘the political establishment’ and 
‘the people’.  Not all challengers (e.g. greens) actually comply with this definition. The study also 
does not adopt the label ‘niche parties’, since challenger parties, especially those in post-communist 
Europe, do not necessarily seek to compete with established parties on the basis of different issues and
policy areas (Sikk 2011; see e.g. Wagner (2011) and Meyer and Miller (2015) for a conceptual 
discussion). The inclusion of cases from Central and Eastern Europe also makes the term ‘outsider 
parties’, as defined by McDonnell and Newell (2011, 445), unsuitable; many of these parties have not 
genuinely ‘gone through a period of not being ‘coalitionable’’.
3 Paul Lucardie (2000) distinguished between ‘prophetic parties’, which articulate a new ideology; 
‘purifiers’, which resemble Rochon’s challengers; and prolocutors, which represent neglected 
interests. Again, ‘challenger parties’ could in principle fall into either one of these categories.   
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have a non-ideological conception of challenger parties and simply include all  those ‘that
have not previously held political office’ (De Vries and Hobolt 2012: 251). It is questionable
whether all parties without governing experience can be seen as genuine ‘challengers’ to the
establishment, or whether parties necessarily lose their challenger character once they enter
office.  In  any  case,  since  this  paper  focuses  on  newly  governing challenger  parties  –  a
pleonasm following the definition of De Vries and Hobolt – the implications of this different
conceptualisation in terms of case selection may be limited. 
In Western Europe, newly governing challenger parties are typically green parties, and
parties of the radical left or the populist (radical) right. Green parties are known for their
environmentalist policies, but many also subscribe to a ‘new politics’ agenda, which involves
a desire to break with traditional representative politics in favour of a more participatory and
decentralised form of democracy (e.g.  Poguntke 1987; Kitschelt  1988;  Rihoux and Rüdig
2006). Radical left parties can be seen as challengers as they ‘advocate alternative economic
and power structures  involving a  major  redistribution of  resources  from existing  political
elites’ (March 2011: 8). Populist parties, including those of the radical right, denounce the
political  elites  for  being  unresponsive  to  the  ‘popular  will’,  or  even corrupt  (e.g.  Mudde
2007). 
In  former  communist  countries  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE),  challenger
parties often emerged in a different form. Roughly a decade after the transition to democracy,
many CEE countries saw the rise of  ideologically centrist  new parties,  which pledged to
improve the quality of government,  and typically criticised the existing political elites for
their  corruption  (Sikk 2011).  Hanley and Sikk (2014:  1)  labelled  these  newcomers  ‘anti-
establishment  reform  parties  (AERPs)’,  and  described  them  as  parties  combining  a
‘mainstream ideology on economic and socio-cultural issues with fierce anti-establishment
rhetoric and demands for political reform, transparency and new ways of ‘doing politics’’.  
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Even though  this  study has  a  broad scope  it  excludes  parties  with  a  specific  and
essentially limited electoral appeal,  such as regionalist  or minority nationalist  parties,  and
pensioner parties. Furthermore, to avoid including parties which are challengers at first sight,
but projects of political elite members in reality – which is a typical phenomenon in post-
communist countries – only ‘genuinely new’ challengers are selected. Following Alan Sikk
(2005: 398), these are ‘parties that are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties,
have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic
politics  among  their  major  members’.  In  effect,  the  study  concentrates  on,  what  Nicole
Bolleyer (2013: 44) calls, ‘outsider formations’. These are parties which are not founded by
national parliamentarians as splinters from existing parties.
The  paper  further  limits  itself  to  challenger  parties  that  took  full  government
responsibility and provided cabinet ministers, and thus excludes parties that merely provided
parliamentary  support  for  minority  governments.  These  latter  parties  are  arguably  not
scrutinised  as  stringently  as  full  coalition  partners,  as  they  lack  genuine  government
responsibility. Nor are they subject to the same organisational pressures as newly governing
parties with an (inexperienced) cabinet branch (see below). 
The study focuses on post-incumbency elections between 2000 and 2014, and thus
generally includes newly governing challenger parties that were in government from the late
1990s  onwards.  This  choice  relates  in  particular  to  Pop-Eleches’s  observation  that
‘unorthodox’ parties began to make inroads in Central and Eastern European party systems
around this time (Pop-Eleches 2010). After a first democratic period in which mainstream
political camps alternated power, many dissatisfied voters turned to these unorthodox parties
in ‘third generation elections’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In Western Europe, on the
other  hand,  not  many challenger  parties  entered  government  before  the  late  1990s.4 One
4 The Italian case is complicated in this regard, due to the party system collapse in 1994, and the 
entrance of parties without an incumbency record into the first Berlusconi Cabinet. For the sake of 
comparability, no exception is made for Italy concerning the period of study, and parties in the 
Berlusconi I coalition are excluded from the analysis.
6
prominent  exception  is  the  Finnish  Green  Party  (VIHR),  which  competed  in  a  post-
incumbency election in 1999. This case is included in this study, in particular because it is one
of the few challengers that increased its vote share after its first period in office. 
*** TABLE 1 HERE ***
Table 1 shows the newly governing challenger parties that are included in this study.5
The selection of AERPs in post-communist countries is largely based on the study of Hanley
and  Sikk (2014:  4),  although  several  parties  have  been  excluded  as  they  did  not  fit  the
‘genuinely new’ criterion.6 The data is mainly collected by means of  European Journal of
Political  Research Political  Data  Yearbooks  and  The  Handbook  of  Political  Change  in
Eastern Europe (Berglund et  al.  2013). The table provides information about the selected
cases, including their ideology (‘type’), the nature of their origin or ‘formative constellation’
(‘orig.’,  see following section),  the year  of their  parliamentary entrance (‘entr.’)  and their
years in office (‘office yrs.’). The ‘prtf%’ column shows the challenger parties’ portfolio share
(or  their  maximum share  if  this  changed  throughout  the  governing  term);  the  ‘partners’
column shows the coalition partners. The subsequent columns contain the national election
vote shares of the challenger parties before (‘vote ante’) and after (‘vote post’) their period in
office, as well as their relative vote gain or loss (Δ) between those elections.
5 Although the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) had already governed between 1983 and 1986, the 
party is included because its ideological focus changed substantially after Jörg Haider assumed 
leadership in 1986, and steered the FPÖ populist radical right direction. The Czech Greens (SZ, in 
government between 2007 and 2009), on the other hand, are excluded. SZ made an ideological shift 
from radical post-modernism to moderate liberalism before entering parliament in 2006.
6 These are the Czech TOP09, Latvian Reform Party (RP), Polish Law and Justice (PiS), Slovakian 
Smer, and Slovenian Gregor Virant's Civic List (LGV). At the time of these parties’ foundation, their 
leadership included prominent national level politicians, who previously acted as independents or as 
representatives of existing parties. Smer, moreover, muted its anti-establishment appeal in the years 
before it entered government (Učeň et al. 2005: 17). 
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The electoral prospects of newly governing challenger parties
Previous contributions suggested that it  is difficult for newly governing parties to leave a
good impression in  office and,  thus,  to sustain their  electoral  support (Deschouwer 2008;
McDonnell and Newell 2011). Indeed, while all parties normally face a trade-off between
participating into government and vote maximisation (Müller and Strøm 1999), studies have
shown that ‘anti-political establishment parties’ tend to lose more heavily than established
parties  after  a  period in  office (Van Spanje 2011;  see also Buelens and Hino 2008).  The
success,  but  mostly  failure,  of  newly  governing  challenger  parties  in  post-incumbency
elections has in the literature often been related to their performance in office as well as their
organisational  robustness.  Indeed,  rather  than  institutional  or  sociological  conditions,  it  is
mainly the agency of political parties which matters in understanding short-term shifts in their
electoral fortunes (Luther 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Zaslove 2012). This study
aims to bring in the role of party agency in a comparative research design with a relatively
large number of cases.    
As far as performance is concerned, the seeds for success or failure in government are
arguably already sown during the coalition formation stage. In her account on small parties in
government,  Nicole Bolleyer (2007) distinguishes between a party’s formation weight and
coalition weight. The former concept relates to a party’s ability to exert influence during the
coalition’s formation, and to maximise concessions from its partners in terms of portfolios and
policies. If a party fails to secure a good deal during the coalition negotiations, it runs the risk
of being dominated during the government’s term. Coalition weight, on the other hand, relates
to a party’s impact during the government’s term and ‘refers to the influence that an actor
possesses when intra-coalitional conflicts emerge’ (Bolleyer 2007: 127). 
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The analytical distinction between the formation phase and the government phase is
meaningful  with  regard  to  the  electoral  appeal  of  challenger  parties  in  post-incumbency
elections.  While  greater  formation  weight  might  add  to  a  party’s  ability  to  influence
government decisions, it also poses a risk for a newly governing challenger; it becomes harder
to deny responsibility and shift the blame to coalition partners if government actions turn out
unpopular. Greater formation weight may, in other words, not necessarily be a blessing in
vote-seeking terms.  It  therefore  makes  sense  to  consider  the  formation weight of  newly
governing challengers in addition to their performance during their term in office.  
As  far  as  the  governing  period  is  concerned,  the  ability  to  sustain  ideological
credibility and claim credit  for achievements have often been identified as key conditions
underlying the electoral survival or demise of various kinds of (newly governing) challengers
(e.g. Dunphy and Bale 2011; Albertazzi et al. 2011; Zaslove 2012). These conditions overlap
considerably in  practice,  as  a  party can claim to have remained true to  its  ideology if  it
redeemed most of its campaign pledges. At the same time, voters are likely to be disappointed
if the newly governing challenger is perceived to realise few of its promises or to sell out its
principles (McDonnell and Newell 2011). 
Since newly governing challengers lack experience in national government and are
often short  of  capable candidates  for  office,  the  risk of  disappointment  tends  to  be great
(Bolleyer 2008).7 For parties with an outspoken anti-establishment appeal it is particularly
challenging to strike a balance between acting effectively as a responsible coalition partner
and  maintaining  a  credible  outsider  appeal  (Heinisch  2003;  Van  Spanje  2011).  Not  all
governing challengers successfully manage to play the role of ‘opposition within government’
and to ‘keep one foot in and one foot out of government’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005;
Albertazzi et al. 2011; Zaslove 2012). 
7 It is worthwhile to note that success in national government may be facilitated by previous 
experience in regional or local government. This is not directly relevant for the analysis, however, 
since this study considers impression in office not as the explanadum, but as an explanans for the 
challengers’ performance in post-incumbency elections.
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Besides its own competence, a challenger’s performance in office is in part dependent
on the performance of its  coalition partners.  It  is  a common scenario that  some coalition
partners win in post-incumbency elections, while others lose (Rose and Mackie 1983). If the
challenger party is on the losing side, this is a likely reflection of a lack of ‘coalition weight’
(Bolleyer 2007). That is, a failure to distinguish itself favourably from its coalition partners
and to win intra-coalitional conflicts. Alternatively, a challenger may be unable to claim credit
for successes, even if the government’s policies were broadly in line with its programme. In
terms  of  electoral  appeal,  perception  may  thus  be  more  important  than  reality.  Indeed,
Akkerman  and  De  Lange  found  that  actual  policy  achievements  did  not  account  for  the
variation in the post-incumbency performances of governing radical right parties (Akkerman
and De Lange 2012). In this study, it is therefore considered whether challenger parties left a
good impression in office, by assessing their  perceived policy effectiveness and ideological
integrity.
Besides  a  challenger’s  ability  to  stick  to  its  promises  and  principles,  also  its
organisational  robustness  is  expected  to  affect  its  performance  in  the  post-incumbency
election.  Even  though  government  participation  is  not  necessarily  detrimental  to  a  (new)
party’s  organisation,  a  party  can  fall  into  disarray  if  its  leadership  ‘fails  to  create  an
infrastructure able to cope with the pressures generated by government’ (Bolleyer et al. 2012:
973).  Tensions  may  typically  emerge  between  the  different  party  branches  (in  office,  in
parliament and ‘on the ground’) (Bolleyer 2008). Notably, entering a coalition government
requires making compromises, and this may leave grass-root members dissatisfied with the
actions of the more pragmatic politicians in office (e.g. McDonnell and Newell 2011; Luther
2011; Rihoux and Rüdig 2006). If a party falls victim to internal strife and splits, this is likely
to impact negatively on its electoral appeal (e.g. Luther 2011; Akkerman and De Lange 2012;
Zaslove 2012). Bearing this in mind, the organisational cohesion of the challenger parties is
taken into consideration: did a challenger withstand the organisational pressures of entering
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office and preserve organisational cohesion? This relates primarily to the degree to which
internal disagreements about the party course could be contained.
If the newly governing challenger fails to prevent publicly visible rows and splits, its
electoral  appeal may seriously dwindle in a relatively short  period of time. However, the
extent to which this – or a lack of policy effectiveness and ideological credibility – truly
harms the electoral  chances of the challenger  is  also likely to depend on more long-term
factors;  in  particular,  the  party’s  rootedness  in  society  and  degree  of  institutionalisation
(Panebianco 1988). If a party developed stable ‘survival interests’ and organisational loyalties
among  its  members  and  followers,  it  is  less  likely  to  be  punished  severely  after  a
disappointing spell in office.
As Nicole Bolleyer (2013) showed, there is a strong relationship between new parties’
formative  constellations  and  their  ability  to  persist  as  an  organisation  and  sustain  their
electoral support. Bolleyer distinguished between ‘rooted’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ parties in this
regard; the former being able to ‘draw on linkages to societal groups which predate the party’s
formation’, the latter lacking such linkages to ‘promoter organisations’ (Bolleyer, 2013: 17).
Entrepreneurial parties have the tendency to rely on the personal appeal of their leader and to
be driven by short-term considerations. They are therefore more vulnerable in the longer run –
even though the persistence and sustainability of entrepreneurs also largely depends on party
elite choices.  Rooted parties, on the other hand, are often characterised by a more robust
organisation and a more stable group of followers. In this study it is therefore expected that,
even if their performance in office was disappointing, rooted challengers will be better able to
survive a period in office than their entrepreneurial counterparts. 
Method and data
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For the analysis,  the study resorts to fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)
techniques (e.g. Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).8 This choice is primarily based
on the notion that the causality underlying the challenger parties’ performance is complex.
Therefore,  this  study does  not  pose  hypotheses  which  are  centred  on  the  effects  of  the
individual explanatory conditions. For instance, some challengers may have suffered defeats
mainly because they added little weight to the coalition, others because they were seen to
betray their  core principles,  and yet  others  because they failed to  preserve  organisational
cohesiveness. Rooted challengers may be able to survive irrespective of the above conditions.
By means of a QCA, one is able to demonstrate the different paths towards a certain
outcome. Besides this principle of ‘equifinality’, a key assumption of QCA is that it is the
combination of conditions (a configuration) that underlies a particular outcome. Conditions
are  thus  not  assumed  to  affect  the  outcome  independently,  and  instead  of  the  term
'independent variable' the term ‘condition’ is preferred. The QCA approach, finally, adheres to
the notion that causality is not necessarily symmetrical; the presence of a certain phenomenon
may be explained by a different configuration of conditions than its absence. 
What  follows from this is  that an fsQCA is not geared at  discovering correlations
between  individual  variables.  The  notion  of  equifinality,  for  instance,  implies  that  a
correlation between one single condition and an outcome may exist in some, but not all cases.
Instead, the analysis is focused on the search for necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions
for a certain outcome to occur (see e.g. Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In relation to the
conditions selected in this study, an fsQCA can for instance show whether a good impression
of challengers in office is a necessary condition for electoral survival, irrespective of whether
it is also a sufficient condition. Or, using another example, the fsQCA may show that a lack of
organisational cohesion in combination with a lack of societal linkages provides a  sufficient
combination of conditions for electoral demise, even though neither of the single conditions
8 Buelens and Hino (2008) use the more rudimentary variant of QCA (crisp set) in their analysis of 
new parties in government in Western European countries. 
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may be necessary for this outcome in isolation. In view of the assumed causal complexity
underlying  challenger  parties’  electoral  fortunes,  reasoning  in  terms  of  necessary  and
sufficient conditions seems more appropriate than reasoning in terms of correlations between
individual variables. 
This  section  discusses  the  way  in  which  the  outcome  variable  and  individual
conditions  are  operationalised.  For  an  fsQCA,  ‘raw  data’  is  calibrated  into  fuzzy  set
‘membership scores’ ranging anywhere in between 0 and 1. This is based on theoretically and
substantively informed choices.  Table 2 presents an overview of the ‘calibration anchors’,
which are further discussed below.   
 *** TABLE 2 HERE ***
Newly governing challenger party electoral survival (SURV)
The  outcome  variable  relates  to  the  post-incumbency  electoral  performance  of  newly
governing challenger parties. In order to operationalise this variable, the ‘direct method’ of
calibration  is  applied.  Accordingly,  three  qualitative  anchors  are  defined;  one  for  full
membership (1), one for full non-membership (0) and one indicating the crossover point (0.5).
By means of logarithmic functions, the FSQCA 2.5 software used in this study then calculates
for all cases the fuzzy set membership score (Ragin and Davey 2012). 
Table 1 showed that most challengers suffered quite heavily after their first term in
office. This is why it makes more sense to study the electoral ‘survival’ of these parties, rather
than their ‘success’; very few newly governing challengers can actually be deemed successful
in post-incumbency elections. Bearing in mind the electoral incumbency costs, as well as the
presumed difficulty of governing for the first time, maintaining the previous vote share can be
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seen as an excellent result for newly governing challenger parties. If a challenger managed to
match its previous vote share it is thus considered to have ‘fully survived’, and receives a
score of ‘1’.9 
The crossover point in this analysis equals a relative vote loss of 55 per cent, which
corresponds to the average electoral change figure of the cases in this study.10 If a newly
governing challenger loses roughly half of its vote share, this is a very substantial defeat, but
it  does  not  necessarily signify the demise of  the party. One clear  exception is  the Italian
Communist  Refoundation  Party  (PRC),  which  failed  to  return  any  MPs  after  its  post-
incumbency election. In fact, the PRC’s ‘vote post’ figure in Table 1 is the vote share of the
Rainbow  Left  coalition  in  which  the  party  took  part.  Since  this  percentage  denotes  an
exaggeration of the party’s support, the SURV score of the PRC is set at 0.33. 
Finally, a case is considered to have ‘fully demised’, and receives a membership score
of 0, if it failed to win any votes. This normally happens when the party seizes to exist after
participating in a governing coalition; a few examples being Public Affairs (VV) in the Czech
Republic and the National Resurrection Party (TPP) in Lithuania.  
Formation weight (WEIGH)
The first explanatory condition relates to a newly governing challenger’s formation weight,
and is operationalised by considering the parties’ share of portfolios (included in Table 1). The
9 Two parties even improved their vote shares: the German and Finish Greens. Yet these are clearly 
exceptions to the rule.
10 Fixing the crossover point to the mean is not necessarily good practice in the calibration 
procedure. Alternative calibrations of the outcome will therefore be considered in a subsequent version
of the analysis. At the moment, the -0.55 crossover value is still considered most appropriate, since it 
indicates a substantial, but in most cases a non-fatal, loss for newly governing challengers in practice. 
One suggested alternative route is to consider whether the challenger loses more or less than its 
coalition partners. This approach would not be consistent with the aim of this study, however, which is
to assess the electoral survival or demise of challengers per se, not their performance relative to their 
coalition partners. The post-incumbency performance of the coalition partners in this study varies 
substantively and is not clearly related to the performance of the challengers.
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‘full  membership’ anchor  equals  50  per  cent  of  the  ministerial  posts.  When a  challenger
attains half of the portfolios, its strength within the coalition can evidently be considered very
substantial.  For the cross-over point (0.5) a portfolio share of 20 per cent is chosen. This
percentage, which is close to the median of 18.8 per cent, indicates that the challenger is a
junior coalition partner, but not one that is gravely outnumbered at the cabinet table.11 The
lower anchor is set at 5 per cent, which implies a role on the sidelines of the coalition. Cases
that approximate this anchor could either thank their government participation to pre-electoral
pacts (Italian PRC, French Greens) or the tradition of having oversized coalitions (Finnish
Greens).
Impression in office (IMPR)
The second condition concerns the impression that newly governing challenger parties left in
office. The condition is operationalised by means of a qualitative assessment of the cases’
perceived policy effectiveness and ideological integrity. This was primarily done on the basis
of  secondary  literature.  In  case  of  doubt  about  individual  parties,  country  experts  were
contacted, and their judgement requested with regard to the draft case descriptions. As will
become clear from the assessment below, no challengers were found to be truly effective or
ideologically consistent.  Therefore,  there are  no good theoretical  grounds for allocating a
score of ‘1’ – implying an optimal impression – to certain cases. The parties are, consequently,
grouped in the three categories below. 
11 The portfolio share of 20 per cent, not the median value, is key in determining the crossover point. 
This percentage implies that the challenger is not the most dominant coalition partner, but still has a 
considerable share of the portfolios. A suggested alternative is to fix the crossover point on the basis of
whether the challenger has a higher or lower proportion of ministerial portfolios compared with its 
vote or seat share. However, this approach would not necessarily lead to a sound proxy for the parties’ 
bargaining power. For instance, while the Finnish, French, Italian and individual Belgian greens all 
participated as non-pivotal partners in oversized coalitions, their vote share to portfolio share ratios 
varied considerably. Moreover, this condition is not primarily included to gauge whether challengers 
have ‘punched above their weight’ during the coalition formation stage, but rather as a measure of 
their actual weight at the start of the coalition.
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Reasonable effectiveness and ideological consistency (score of 0.67)
Seven parties have performed reasonably well during their time in office, at least when their
governing record is compared with the remaining challengers in this study. These are mostly
Western European greens. None of these parties played a dominant role within their coalitions
and  all  faced  painful  compromises  which  were  disappointing  to  their  supporters  (Müller
Rommel and Poguntke 2002). Though their effectiveness was thus small in absolute terms,
most could be seen to make attempts to advance their agendas. The parties also managed to
get at least some of their policies implemented. The Belgian greens (Agalev in Flanders and
Ecolo in Wallonia), for instance, saw their preferred liberal policies on drugs, euthanasia and
same-sex relationship realised (Buelens and Deschouwer 2002). The Green Party in Finland
(VIHR) could claim victory with regard to the implementation of eco taxes and fiscal benefits
for lower incomes (Paastela 2002). In France, Les Verts could implement at least parts of their
environmentalist agenda, which was appreciated by many of the party’s members (Boy 2002).
The German  Grüne saw successes such as the introduction of ‘dual nationality’ for long-
standing foreign residents (Rüdig 2002). In addition, the floods that struck Germany in the
run-up  to  the  federal  election  of  2002  constituted  an  ‘event’  which  the  Greens  could
conveniently frame as evidence for global warming. 
Similar to most green parties, the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV) had to make
painful compromises and was often out-manoeuvred by its social democratic senior partner
(Allern 2010; Dunphy and Bale 2011). At least, however, the party could be seen standing up
for its principles in areas such as foreign affairs and immigration. Beyond Western Europe,
finally,  the  Latvian  New Era  party  (JL)  was  able  to  retain  its  challenger  character  as  it
continued its supposed fight against corruption in office (Ikstens 2004; Sikk 2011). Although
fraud  accusations  against  party  leader  Einars  Repše  dented  the  party’s  anti-corruption
credibility, the JL leader was eventually cleared (Ikstens 2007). 
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Limited effectiveness and ideological consistency (score of 0.33) 
The second category includes parties that were (even) less successful in maintaining their
ideological  profile  or  receiving  credit  for  enacting  their  policies.  One such  case  was  the
Austrian  Freedom Party (FPÖ) after  it  took office  in  1999.  A high degree  of  ministerial
turnover attested the incompetence of individual FPÖ minsters, and the party was blamed by
its grass-root members for selling out its core principles (Luther 2011). Governing partner
ÖVP was able to profit from the FPÖ’s weakness. The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) won the 2002
Dutch national election – after its leader was assassinated – and entered office, but continuous
bickering  between  inexperienced  and  ostensibly  incompetent  LPF  politicians  tainted  the
party’s credibility and limited its effectiveness (De Lange and Art 2011). Another newcomer
that  experienced a  meteoric  rise,  the  Estonian Res Publica (RP),  failed  to  implement  the
promised  political  reforms  and  alienated  its  core  constituency  by  moving  away  from
economic centrism (Taagepera 2006:  78).  In  neighbouring Latvia,  the much smaller  New
Party (JP) was not able to stand out positively from its senior coalition partners – even less so
after its popular figurehead Raimonds Pauls left the party.
Three left-wing junior coalition partners also failed to impress. In Italy, the Greens
(Verdi) failed to play a visible role in government or to claim credit for the environmental
policies enacted (Biorcio 2002). Verdi’s approval of Italy’s participation in the Kosovo war
alienated many supporters in particular. The governing record of the radical left Communist
Refoundation  Party  (PRC)  was  also  poor;  the  party  ‘could  neither  credibly  disclaim
responsibility  for  unpopular  measures  nor  obtain  results  on  issues  central  to  the  party’
(Albertazzi et al. 2011: 482). The Irish Greens took part in a reviled government, which was
held responsible for the deep recession that hit the country. The Irish public mainly came to
view the Greens ‘as having propped up a corrupt and failed government for far too long and
apparently punished them accordingly’ (FitzGibbon 2011: 11). 
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Finally,  two  parties  are  placed  in  this  category  mainly  because  they  lost  their
‘challenger’ credentials in office. By the end of its (second) period in government in 2004, the
Lithuanian  New Union (Social  Liberals)  (NS) was hardly distinguishable from the social
democratic LSDP in programmatic terms, and the two coalition partners even formed a joint
list for the 2004 election (Sikk 2011). In Slovakia, the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP)
underwent a similar fate. The party discarded its anti-establishment appeal in office and ran
on the social democratic (SDL’) list in 2002 (Učeň et al. 2005).
Lack of effectiveness and ideological consistency (score of 0)
The third category includes cases in Central and Eastern Europe which disappointed in office,
but also betrayed their promise of ‘cleansing politics’ due to their involvement in scandals.
The Bulgarian National Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV) not only failed to live up to
expectations (Karasimeonov and Lyubenov 2013: 413), but also ‘proved to be just as corrupt
and opaque as previous governments’ (Ghodsee 2008: 29). The government that was later
formed by the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) similarly failed to
improve the Bulgarians’ quality of life, and various corruption scandals blemished the party’s
image (Kolarova and Spirova 2011; 2012; 2013; Cholova 2013). The government resigned in
2013 amidst swelling public protests. 
In Slovakia, the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) not only ‘abandoned its anti-
establishment  plea’ (Učeň et  al.  2005: 17),  but  also lost  its  corruption-fighting credibility
when its  leader, media tycoon Pavol  Rusko,  was involved in  a  blackmailing  scandal  and
suspicious  business  deals  (Učeň  2004;  2006).  Four  years  after  ANO’s demise,  the  party
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) joined an unsuccessful coalition that fell within two years. In
addition,  SaS  leader  Richard  Sulík  came under  fire  as  he  was  found  to  have  ‘discussed
sensitive  parliamentary  business  with  a  notorious  entrepreneur  who  had  a  very  dubious
history’ (Henderson 2012: 6). 
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Two new Lithuanian AERPs followed a similar trajectory. The Labour Party (DP) was
tainted by scandals soon after it entered office, and charges of tax fraud led to the resignation
of  party  leader  Viktor  Uspaskich  as  minister,  and  the  party’s  departure  from  office
(Krupavicius, 2007). The National Resurrection Party (TPP) entered government in 2008, but
its figurehead Arūnas Valinskas soon became a figure of controversy, not least  due to his
alleged criminal ties (Krupavicius 2010: 1067). 
In  Poland,  the  populist  left-wing  Self  Defence  (SO)  became outflanked by senior
partner  Law  and  Justice  and,  furthermore,  entangled  in  practices  of  sleaze,  bribery  and
corruption (Millard 2010: 145-7). The Czech Public Affairs (VV) could also not live up to its
promises of fighting corruption and improving transparency in politics, as the party was soon
ridden with scandals itself (Havlík 2012). Finally, the leader of Positive Slovenia (PS), Zoran
Janković, was charged with corruption even before the party entered office (Krašovec and
Haughton 2014). Under a new leadership, PS subsequently headed a coalition that only lasted
for little more than a year.
Organisational Cohesion (COH)
The operationalisation of the third condition, organisational cohesion, is similarly based on a
qualitative assessment of the cases, on the basis of which the four categories below can be
distinguished.
Internal conflicts largely absent (score of 1)
Two cases can be rewarded a maximum score for their organisational cohesion. In France, Les
Verts’ partaking in office was met with little opposition inside the party and was generally
judged positively (Boy 2002). The same applies to the Flemish Agalev, whose members were
less reluctant to enter office than their Walloon counterparts (Buelens and Delwit 2008). 
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Publicly visible dissent, but few or no defections (score of 0.67)
The  grass-root  members  of  other  green  parties  in,  for  instance,  Wallonia,  Finland  and
Germany, were  less  unified  in  their  support  for  government  participation  and  the  related
compromises  (Müller  Rommel  and  Poguntke  2002;  Frankland  et  al.  2008).  Generally
speaking,  however,  conflicts  within  the  party  organisations  could  be  contained,  so  that
parliamentary party splits or defection from high-profile politicians were avoided. In the wake
of the crisis and the bailing out of banks, tensions also rose within the Irish Green Party, but
this did not lead to a split in the parliamentary party. In Norway, SV politicians repeatedly
voiced  opposition  to  government  actions  (Dunphy  and  Bale  2011:  496),  but  the  party’s
organisational  integrity was preserved.  In  post-communist-Europe,  the Latvian  JL did  not
suffer  from prominent  intra-party  conflicts  either  in  the  period  between  2002  and  2006,
irrespective of the departure of a few MPs. GERB in Bulgaria, finally, did not suffer from
genuine splits during its first period on office. A raft of ministers were replaced following
poor performance and scandals (Kolarova and Spirova 2011; 2012; 2013), but this was not
primarily borne out of ideological disagreement.     
Publicly visible dissent provoking defections or government breakdown (score of 0.33)
Other newly governing challengers had greater problems with avoiding defections or ruptures.
The Austrian FPÖ was troubled by conflicts between the more pragmatic party in office and
the ideologically-driven extra-parliamentary party (Luther 2011). These eventually provoked
the  resignation  of  the  government  in  2002.  Conflicts  also  plagued  the  Italian  Greens
throughout their period in office, prompting leadership changes as well as the departure of
senior  members  (Biorcio  2002).  The  radical  left  PRC also  faced  disagreements  over  the
party’s role in government, a lack of party discipline, and breakaways from the parliamentary
group (Albertazzi et al. 2011: 472-3). The Dutch LPF was marked by internal turmoil even
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since the murder of its leader, causing the rapid breakdown of the government (De Lange and
Art 2011). 
In Slovakia, SOP saw defections from its parliamentary group in 2001, in part due to
ideological disagreements (Učeň 2002). ANO, too, suffered from conflicts and a particularly
serious split in August 2005, when several ANO politicians rebelled against leader Rusko and
took over the party’s positions in government (Učeň 2006). SaS, in turn, experienced a split
when four of its 18 allied deputies of the ‘Ordinary People’ faction seceded from the party
authority (Deegan-Krause 2013: 274). In Lithuania, the NS lost six of its 28 MPs throughout
its  time in office.  In the subsequent period,  the DP also had organisational problems; the
parliamentary group saw a considerable number of defections and party leader Uspaskich
went into hiding in Russia between 2006 and 2007 after facing fraud accusations (Krupavicius
2007). 
Challengers in other post-communist countries also had their share of organisational
problems.  The  Bulgarian  NDSV  witnessed  the  breakaway  of  a  ‘succession  of  splinter
movements’ (Karasimeonov and Lyubenov 2013: 414).  The  Estonian Res Publica seized to
exist as an autonomous entity; a sheer downfall in the party’s popularity induced a merger
with the conservative Pro Patria Union (Pettai  2007). By that time, the party’s first  high-
profile leader Rein Taagepera had already left the party and intra-party conflicts arose about
the shape of the new party organisation.  In Poland, SO continued to suffer from defecting
MPs, partly due to the efforts of senior partner Law and Justice to undermine its coalition
partners (Millard 2010: 145).12 The Slovenian PS, finally, witnessed a split after a leadership
change in April 2014 – which also instigated the end of the governing coalition. 
12 The other coalition partner, the League of Polish Families (LPR), was also a newly governing 
party with an anti-establishment appeal. Since the LPR partly emerged out of the previously governing
Solidarity Electoral Action alliance this case does not comply with the ‘genuinely new’ criterion, and 
is therefore excluded from the analysis. Its governing record and electoral trajectory are, in any case, 
similar to SO’s. 
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Complete party disintegration (score of 0)
The final category includes party organisations which truly seized to exist.  The Lithuanian
TPP split into two in July 2009 due to internal conflicts. One faction was later absorbed by
coalition partner Liberal and Centre Union, the other did not stand in the subsequent election.
The Czech VV was marked by conflicts between party chairman Bárta and several MPs. After
several defections and expulsions, VV eventually faced a split in 2012 and did not compete in
the  subsequent  election  of  2013.  The  Latvian  JP, finally,  disintegrated  after  leader  Pauls
became an independent MP, and several JP politicians joined the new conservative Latvia's
First Party.  
Rootedness of challenger formation (ROOT)
In order to operationalise the condition related to the challengers’ organisational roots, this
study borrows Bolleyer’s (2013) distinction between rooted and entrepreneurial parties. Since
rooted parties are expected to have a greater chance of survival, a score of ‘1’ is allocated to
these  parties,  and  a  score  of  ‘0’ to  the  entrepreneurs.  The  green  and  radical  left  parties
included in this study are examples of rooted formations, originally relying on the support of
environmental and leftist promoter organisations, respectively (Bolleyer 2013). SO in Poland
grew out of a farmer’s trade union and protest  movement (Millard 2010: 102),  while  the
Austrian FPÖ originated from a range of (German) nationalist movements. The Dutch LPF
and the AERPs in Central and Eastern Europe are typical examples of entrepreneurial parties,
and  could  more  often  than  not  be  considered  the  personal  vehicles  of  their  leaders.  A
comparison  between  the  ‘orig.’  and  ‘entr.’  columns  in  Table  1  reveals  that  the  rooted
challengers in this study tended to have a much longer parliamentary experience than the
entrepreneurs. 
Based on the qualitative anchors set, Table 3 shows the fuzzy set membership scores
of the cases in all conditions and the outcome.
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*** TABLE 3 HERE ***
Findings
Assessment of Necessity
The first step in the fsQCA is to assess whether there are any single conditions that can be
considered necessary for the presence (or absence) of challenger party survival. In order to
determine whether  a  particular  condition is  necessary, it  is  considered whether  challenger
party survival or demise is a ‘subset’ of this condition. If this is the case, the membership
values of the cases in the condition (X) are equal to or higher than the corresponding values in
the outcome (Y). If a condition is necessary, after all, X should be present whenever Y is
present. The degree to which a subset relation has been approximated is calculated by means
of a ‘set theoretic consistency’ formula.13 
Taking challenger party survival as the outcome, the analysis returned no consistency
scores close to one, meaning that no necessary conditions were found.14 If challenger party
demise is taken as the outcome, the analysis  yielded a consistency score of 0.912 for the
negated IMPR condition (~IMPR).15  This means that the lack of a good impression in office
of a challenger can be considered a necessary condition for the challenger party’s electoral
demise (~SURV). Only two cases can be seen as truly deviant: Agalev and Ecolo in Belgium
(see Figure 1). These parties have experienced a serious electoral loss after their period in
13 The consistency formula for necessary conditions is ∑(min(Xi, Yi))/∑(Yi) (Ragin 2006, 291).
14 With SURV as outcome, the consistency scores related to the various conditions are: WEIGH 
0.623; IMPR 0.574; COH 0.763; ROOT 0.577; ~WEIGH 0.572; ~IMPR 0.712; ~COH 0.601; ~ROOT 
0.423.  The ‘~’ sign denotes the absence of the condition.              
15 With ~SURV as outcome, the consistency score related to the other conditions are: WEIGH 0.546; 
IMPR 0.321; COH 0.472; ROOT 0.328; ~WEIGH 0.612; ~COH 0.824; ~ROOT 0.672.
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office, even though they made a relatively reasonable, or at least not-devastating, impression
in office. 
*** FIGURE 1 HERE ***
It must be noted that the relevance of ~IMPR as a necessary condition is not very high.
This is suggested by the measure for the coverage of necessary conditions, which yields a
value of 0.725,16 as well as the distribution of cases in Figure 1 (see Schneider and Wagemann
2012, 233-7). The ~IMPR set on the x-axis is somewhat skewed towards high membership.
That is, most challenger parties left a rather poor impression in office, whether they survived
or not. Thus, although a poor impression in office can be considered a necessary condition for
challenger  demise,  this  does  not  mean that  electoral  survivors  always  left  a  much better
impression.  This  leads  us  back  to  the  finding  that  a  good  impression  in  office  is  not  a
necessary condition for challenger party survival. There are various instances where newly
governing challengers have survived reasonably well despite a relatively poor performance in
office, the Bulgarian GERB being the most obvious case in point. 
*** FIGURE 2 HERE ***
While there are thus no single conditions which can be considered necessary for the
survival of newly governing challengers, a closer examination of the data does reveal that
survivors  were  all  characterised  by  either a  hefty  formation  weight  or  a  rooted  party
organisation. Figure 2 also shows that the SURV outcome is a subset of the WEIGHT+ROOT
configuration (denoting the presence of either formation weight or organisational rootedness).
16 The formula for the coverage of a necessary condition is ∑(min(Xi,Yi))/∑(Xi) (see Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 144).
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Assessment of Sufficiency
The next objective in the analysis is to determine which (combinations of) conditions were
sufficient for the presence (or absence) of challenger party survival. This again involves a
search for subset relationships. Contrary to the consistency test for necessary conditions, the
consistency test for sufficient configurations assesses whether the configurations are a subset
of the outcome.17 This follows from the logic that,  in theory, the presence of a  sufficient
configuration should lead to the presence of the outcome – in practice, consistency scores tend
to be lower than 1.  Following the calibration process, cases have previously received a fuzzy
set  membership  score  between  0  and  1  in  each  individual  condition  (see  Table  3).
Subsequently,  their  membership  in  each  of  the  possible  combinations of  conditions  (the
configurations)  can  be  calculated.18 Each  case  has  a  membership  of  >0.5  in  one
(dichotomously expressed) configuration only. Table 4 presents a ‘truth table’ which provides
an overview of the configurations with empirical referents, i.e. those configurations which are
‘covered’ by corresponding cases with a membership score of more than 0.5. The consistency
(‘consist.’)  columns  in  Table  4  report  to  what  extent  a  subset  relationship  has  been
approximated with SURV and ~SURV as outcomes. 
*** TABLE 4 HERE ***
Sufficiency for challenger party survival (SURV)
The first part of the analysis considers which configurations of conditions are sufficient for
challenger party survival.  The configurations in the first six rows of the truth table reach
consistency levels  high  enough  to  conventionally  consider  them subsets  of  the  ‘survive’
outcome. The consistency score of row 7 is also reasonably high, but the path is covered by
17 The consistency formula for sufficient conditions is ∑(min(Xi,Yi))/∑(Xi) (see Ragin 2009, 108; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012, Chapter 5).
18 See e.g. Schneider and Wagemann (2012), Chapter 4 for this procedure. 
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two cases of demise (SO and PRC) and one party (Verdi) whose electoral and parliamentary
survival  has  partly  been  secured  through  participation  in  an  electoral  coalition.  Rows  3
through 5 also raise questions, as they include cases of non-survival; the Irish and Flemish
Greens even disappeared from parliament after their post-incumbency elections. Hence, while
the consistency scores suggest that the first six rows constitute ‘paths to survival’, this is not
always confirmed by the empirical referents.
In the end, only the first three rows are included in the in the analysis of sufficiency,
since the PRI consistency values of rows 4 through 6 do not reach satisfactory levels (see
Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 237-244). This implies that the associated configurations are
not evidently subsets of the SURV outcome only; particularly the sixth configuration also
reaches a high consistency score if the ~SURV outcome is selected. While only the first three
rows are included, the survival of GERB remains unexplained by the following analysis. In
the  next  step,  a  Boolean  minimisation  process  is  carried  out  to  discard  conditions  in  a
particular  configuration  that  are  irrelevant  for  the  outcome.  This  leads  to  minimised
configurations or ‘prime implicants’.  A typical analysis  by means of the FSQCA software
produces  three  different  results:  a  complex,  parsimonious,  and  intermediate  solution.
Regarding the latter two solutions, simplifying assumptions are made about the configurations
without  empirical  referents  (the  logical  remainders).  For  a  parsimonious  solution,  a
hypothetical  outcome  is  allocated  to  the  logical  remainders  if  this  leads  to  a  more
parsimonious  solution.  For  the  intermediate  solution,  which  is  here  preferred,  only
theoretically plausible simplifying assumptions are made. The analyses for the intermediate
solution only made use of logical remainders if the outcomes were consistent with the notion
that  IMPR, COH,  and ROOT stimulate  challenger  party survival  (and vice  versa  for  the
analysis of challenger party demise). No assumptions were made about WEIGH. As discussed
above, a heavy formation weight may not necessarily be a virtue if the government turns out
to be unpopular.  
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*** TABLE 5 HERE ***
The complex solution equals the intermediate solution, and is depicted in Table 5. It
constitutes of two paths, which both contain the combination of a reasonable impression in
office and a reasonable degree of organisational cohesion, in addition to either a substantial
formation weight, or a rooted party organisation. The presence of either WEIGH or ROOT in
the paths is unsurprising, as the previous analysis of necessity indicated that either one of
these conditions was always  present  in  case of challenger  party survival.  The sufficiency
analysis  shows  that  surviving  challenger  parties  combined  WEIGH  or  ROOT  with  a
reasonable impression in office and organisational cohesiveness. Note that the Norwegian SV
complies with both configurations. 
Two caveats must  be stressed.  First,  the second path is  covered by two cases,  the
Belgian  green  parties,  which  were  actually  cases  of  demise.  This  indicates  that  the
configuration IMPR*COH*ROOT does not in all cases imply the survival of newly governing
challengers.  Second,  not  all  cases  of  survival  are  explained  by  this  solution  as  their
corresponding  truth  table  rows  have  not  been  included  in  the  analysis.  GERB  is  one
prominent example.
Notably, while most surviving challengers were characterised by a reasonable (or not-
disastrous) impression in office, the Bulgarian GERB is a clear exception to the rule. There
are also parties which (barely) survived after leaving a poor impression in office and failing to
preserve organisational cohesion: Verdi, Res Publica, SaS and NDSV. Their survival cannot
be accounted for by the given solutions. However, since SaS and NDSV are very close to the
0.5 crossover value in the outcome, these are not the most clear-cut cases of survival. At the
same  time,  the  employed  post-incumbency  election  figures  of  Verdi  and  Res  Publica
exaggerate  their  actual  performance.  Verdi,  as  mentioned,  participated  in  an  electoral
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coalition, while the Res Publica figure represents the vote share of the Pro Patria and Res
Publica Union, which was the party Res Publica merged into prior to the 2007 election. 
Sufficiency for challenger party demise (~SURV)
The final step in the fsQCA is to assess which configurations can be deemed sufficient for the
electoral demise of newly governing challenger parties. Table 6 shows the complex solution –
which  is  identical  to  the  intermediate  solution  –  when  truth  table  rows  7  through  9  are
included in the analysis (see Table 4). It must be noted that the inclusion of row 7 is somewhat
disputable, since it has a low consistency score. This is largely due to the Verdi case, whose
score in the SURV outcome can be seen as an overestimation of the party’s actual popularity.
If the party’s SURV score is lowered to 0.33, the consistency level of row 7 with ~SURV as
outcome actually rises to 0.784.  
*** TABLE 6 HERE ***
The results indicate that challengers which failed to survive were all characterised by a
poor impression in office and a lack of organisational cohesiveness. In addition, they were
non-rooted entrepreneurial parties or parties which lacked formation weight – TPP, JP, SOP
and ANO actually comply with all these characteristics. The results are a mirror image of the
findings from the sufficiency analysis with SURV as outcome, and are generally in line with
the theoretical expectations. Four cases constitute exceptions to the rule: NDSV, RP, SaS and
Verdi. As discussed, however, these four parties are not unambiguous cases of survival. When,
following  a  conservative  approach,  row  7  is  excluded  from  the  analysis,  the
~IMPR*~COH*~WEIGH  path  disappears  from  the  solution.  This  does  not  defy  the
observation  that  most  demising  challengers,  including  many  AERPs  in  post-communist
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Europe,  were  marked  by  a  lack  of  cohesiveness,  a  poor  impression  in  office  and  an
entrepreneurial origin.   
Two cases of non-survival remain unexplained by the solution altogether: the FPÖ and
the  Irish Greens.  It  can  be noted  that  the  FPÖ is  arguably not  a  clear-cut  case  of  ‘non-
survival’; the party still easily crossed the electoral threshold with 10 per cent of the vote.
Irrespective of this, an in-depth appraisal of the case suggests that a weak impression in office
and a lack of internal unity lay at the basis of a poor result in the post-incumbency election
(Luther 2011). Even though the Irish Greens remained fairly united, their electoral demise
should  be  assessed  in  light  of  exceptional  crisis-laden  circumstances  and  the  public
disapproval of the entire governing coalition (FitzGibbon 2011). 
Conclusions
In many countries in Europe, members of mainstream party families have seen their dominant
electoral position being challenged. As became evident in this study, however, ‘challenger
parties’  tend  to  have  a  hard  time  sustaining  their  support  after  they  enter  office  (see
Deschouwer 2008; Van Spanje 2011). This is true in Western Europe, where traditional parties
have long dominated national governments, but also in many post-communist countries in
Central  and Eastern Europe marked by more volatile  party systems. This study sought to
clarify the conditions underlying the electoral survival or demise of a broad range of newly
governing challenger  parties.  This  category included green,  radical  left  and populist  right
parties, as well as so-called ‘anti-establishment reform parties’ (AERPs) in post-communist
Europe (Hanley and Sikk 2014). 
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The analysis  indicated that surviving challengers were all characterised by either a
considerable formation weight (in terms of portfolio share) or, in most cases, a rooted party
organisation – which normally also translated into more years of parliamentary experience. In
addition,  survivors  were  typically  characterised  by a  reasonable  impression  in  office  and
organisational cohesiveness;  that is,  the ability to prevent serious intra-party conflicts and
defections.  It must be stressed that none of them truly left a great impression in office. The
surviving  green  parties,  for  instance,  saw some  of  their  policies  enacted,  but  all  had  to
swallow  painful  compromises  and  none  genuinely  controlled  their  government’s  agenda.
Compared with many less successful  cases,  however, most surviving challengers could at
least claim to have shown a decent degree of ideological integrity.
On the other hand, most parties that failed to survive electorally, or at least lost more
than half  of their  pre-incumbency vote share,  were characterised by a poor impression in
office (see e.g. Akkerman and De Lange 2012; Zaslove 2012). Their politicians came across
as ineffective and incompetent, or betrayed their party’s core promise of ‘cleaning politics’
due to their involvement in murky financial deals or other scandals. Most non-survivors also
failed  to  prevent  intra-party  conflicts  and  saw  the  defection  of  a  substantial  amount  of
parliamentarians, or even the complete disintegration of their party. Particularly in Central and
Eastern Europe, failing challengers were typically leader-centred entrepreneurial parties.  
The clearest, albeit rough, divide in this study can be made between surviving Western
European green parties and demising AERPs in post-communist Europe – which also happen
to be the two most ‘populous’ party categories in this study. Even though their achievements
in  office  were  limited,  surviving  green parties  could  benefit  from a  more  loyal  share  of
supporters,  who  were  seemingly  more  ‘appreciative  of  the  inherent  limitations  of
governmental  participation’  and  readier  to  tolerate  their  parties’  concessions  in  office
(Poguntke 2002: 141). In addition, their ability to prevent organisational disintegration can be
related to their rootedness and higher degrees of professionalisation and institutionalisation
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(Frankland et al. 2008; Bolleyer 2013). The AERPs, on the other hand, were entrepreneurs
whose support crumbled soon after a disappointing spell in office. In post-communist Europe
ties between voters and parties generally remain weak, political trust and participation low,
and volatility levels high (e.g. Pop-Eleches 2010). Erstwhile supporters lacking party loyalty
have  little  reason  to  continue  lending  their  votes  to  challengers  which  failed  to  make  a
difference.       
From the findings we can also deduce that,  even though they can be described as
challengers  to  mainstream ideologies,  most  survivors  lacked a  genuinely aggressive  anti-
establishment appeal (see Buelens and Hino 2008). These include green parties who have,
over time, actually become conventional members of their party systems (Frankland et al.
2008; Bolleyer 2013: 123). For these parties there was less need to play the role of ‘opposition
within  government’ in  order  to  maintain  their  ideological  credibility  (see  Albertazzi  and
McDonnell 2005; Zaslove 2012). They could therefore adopt a more accommodating attitude
towards mainstream coalition partners. In the cases of the German and Finish Greens, as well
as the Norwegian Socialist Left, government participation was even renewed after their first
period in power.19 For parties such as the populist FPÖ and LPF and the AERPs in Central and
Eastern Europe,  it  was more daunting to strike a balance between acting responsibly and
preserving  their  distinctive  anti-establishment  character.  For  governing  challengers
characterised by a genuinely antagonistic attitude towards established politics, it is ostensibly
more difficult to sustain their electoral appeal. 
Notwithstanding the broad patterns outlined, the survival or demise of several cases
remains  somewhat  puzzling  from a  comparative  perspective.  Why did  the  Belgian  green
parties suffer badly in their post-incumbency election, while their record in office was not
markedly worse  in  comparison with  surviving  counterparts?  One possible  answer  is  that,
perhaps more than concrete achievements, the management of supporters’ expectations plays
19 The Bulgarian NDSV also continued governing, but this only led to the party’s further demise.
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an important  role.  Hindered  by unfavourable  ‘events’ in  the  run up to  the  2003 election
(Swyngedouw 2004), the Belgian Greens had problems conveying their achievements to their
supporters, a lot of whom eventually defected to the socialists (Buelens and Delwit 2008;
Rihoux  and  Rüdig  2006:  S24).  Many  members  of  the  French  Verts,  on  the  other  hand,
accepted that being marginally effective in government was better than a role on the side-lines
as an insignificant opposition party (without parliamentary representation) (Boy 2002). GERB
in Bulgaria also stands out as an interesting case, as it survived reasonably well despite the
growing disappointment with the GERB single-party government towards the end of its term.
Part of the explanation should probably be sought in the weakness of the opposition, which
consisted of parties that built  up a disreputable image during their  earlier  spells  in office
(Kolarova and Spirova 2011).
Thus, even though particularly rootedness and organisational stability go a long way in
explaining electoral survival, the role of political context and additional agential conditions
should not be ignored (see Bolleyer 2013). Further research could therefore focus also on the
strength of the opposition, as well as the ways in which governing challengers frame their
achievements in their aim to satisfy core supporters. Future studies will also have to point out
whether more radical anti-establishment challengers in office will be able to learn from the
mistakes of their unsuccessful predecessors (see De Lange and Art 2011). This question also
applies to the entrepreneurial AERPs in post-communist Europe, which have thus far found it
difficult to sustain their (often quite substantial) initial levels of support.  
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Table 1: Newly governing challenger parties in Europe (1999-2014)
country party type orig. entr. office yrs* prtf% partners§ vote ante vote post~ Δ#
Austria FPÖ Pop Right root 1956 2000-2002 50.0% ÖVP 26.9% 10.0% -0.63
Belgium Agalev Green root 1981 1999-2003 11.1% VLD, PRL, SP, PS 7.0% 2.5% -0.64
Ecolo Green root 1981 1999-2003 11.1% VLD, PRL, SP, PS 7.4% 3.1% -0.58
Bulgaria NDSV AERP entr 2001 2001-2005 76.4% DPS 42.7% 19.9% -0.53
GERB AERP entr 2009 2009-2013 100.0% - 39.7% 30.5% -0.23
Czech Rep. VV AERP entr 2010 2010-2013 26.7% ODS, TOP09 10.9% 0.0% -1.00
Estonia RP AERP entr 2003 2003-2005 35.7% RE, ERL 24.6% 17.9% -0.27
Finland VIHR Green root 1983 1995-1999 5.6% SDP, KOK, SFP, VAS 6.5% 7.3% 0.12
France Verts Green root 1997 1997-2002 5.9% PS, PCF, PRG, MDC 6.8% 4.5% -0.34
Germany Grüne Green root 1983 1998-2002 18.8% SPD 6.7% 8.6% 0.28
Ireland Green Green root 1989 2007-2011 13.3% FF, PD, GP 4.7% 1.8% -0.62
Italy Verdi Green root 1987 1996-2001 8.0% ULIVO 2.5% 2.2% -0.12
PRC Rad Left root 1992 2006-2008 3.7% UNIONE 5.8% 3.1% -0.47
Latvia JP AERP entr 1998 1998-2002 13.3% LC, TB-LNNK, LSDSP / TP 7.3% 0.0% -1.00
JL AERP entr 2002 2002-2006 50.0% ZZS, LPP, TB-LNNK / TP 23.9% 16.4% -0.31
Lithuania NS AERP entr 2000 2000-2004 42.8% LLS / LSDP 19.6% 7.3% -0.63
DP AERP entr 2004 2004-2006 35.7% LSDP, NS, LVLS 28.4% 9.0% -0.68
TPP AERP entr 2008 2008-2010 13.3% TS-LKD, LRLS, LiCS 15.1% 0.0% -1.00
Netherlands LPF Pop Right entr 2002 2002-2003 28.6% CDA, VVD 17.0% 5.6% -0.67
Norway SV Rad Left root 1973 2005-2009 26.3% DNA, SP 8.8% 6.2% -0.30
Poland SO Rad Left root 2001 2006-2007 9.1% PiS, LPR 11.4% 1.5% -0.87
Slovakia SOP AERP entr 1998 1998-2002 10.0% SDK, SDL’, SMK 8.0% 0.0% -1.00
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ANO AERP entr 2002 2002-2006 18.8% SDKU, SMK, KDH 8.0% 1.4% -0.83
SaS AERP entr 2010 2010-2012 26.7% SDKU-DS, KDH, MH 12.1% 5.9% -0.51
Slovenia PS AERP entr 2011 2013-2014 38.5% SD, LGV, DESUS 28.5% 3.0% -0.89
* For the following cases, given years in office do not equal the election years (specified between brackets): Austria (1999; 2002);  Estonia (2003; 2007); Lithuania (2004;
2008; 2012); Poland (2005; 2007); Slovenia (2011; 2014).
§ Cabinet composition changed during the parliamentary term in Italy (both periods); Latvia (both periods); Lithuania (2000-2004).     
~ In the case of Italy, the figures overrate the performance of the challenger parties since they represent the election results of the electoral alliances they were part of. This also
applies to the Estonian Res Publica, which merged with the then smaller conservative Pro Patria Union. The Lithuanian NS, meanwhile, entered an electoral coalition with the
Social Democratic LSDP in 2004. The given NS vote share is calculated by dividing the coalition’s vote share (20.7) according to the seat distribution between the two parties
(20 for LSDP, 11 for NS).   
# This column shows the relative vote gain/loss of the challengers, and is calculated by dividing the vote gain/loss in percentage points by the ‘vote ante’ percentage. 
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Table 2: Conditions in the fsQCA
Conditions Description Calibration
SURV Relative vote gain/loss of the challenger party after its period 
in office. Calibration on the basis of ‘Δ’ column in in Table 1.   
1 = 0.0
0.5 = -0.55
0 = -1.0
WEIGH Portfolios allocated to the challenger party. Calibration on the 
basis of ‘prtf%’ column in in Table 1.
1 = 50.0%
0.5 = 20.0%
0 = 5.0%
IMPR Challenger party impression in office. See text
COH Organisational cohesion of the challenger party See text
ROOT Party origin: rooted or entrepreneurial 1 = rooted
0 = entrepreneurial
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Table 3: Calibrated data for the fsQCA
Conditions Outcome
Country Party WEIGH IMPR COH ROOT SURV
Austria FPÖ 1 0.33 0.33 1 0.37
Belgium Agalev 0.14 0.67 1 1 0.35
Ecolo 0.14 0.67 0.67 1 0.45
Bulgaria NDSV 1 0 0.33 0 0.53
GERB 1 0 0.67 0 0.85
Czech Rep. VV 0.67 0 0 0 0
Estonia RP 0.83 0.33 0.33 0 0.82
Finland VIHR 0.06 0.67 0.67 1 1
France Verts 0.06 0.67 1 1 0.76
Germany Grüne 0.45 0.67 0.67 1 1
Ireland Green 0.2 0.33 0.67 1 0.39
Italy Verdi 0.07 0.33 0.33 1 0.91
PRC 0 0.33 0.33 1 0.33
Latvia JP 0.2 0.33 0 0 0
JL 1 0.67 0.67 0 0.79
Lithuania NS 0.91 0.33 0.33 0 0.37
DP 0.83 0 0.33 0 0.3
TPP 0.2 0 0 0 0
Netherlands LPF 0.71 0.33 0.33 0 0.31
Norway SV 0.65 0.67 0.67 1 0.8
Poland SO 0.1 0 0.33 1 0.11
Slovakia SOP 0.12 0.33 0.33 0 0
ANO 0.45 0 0.33 0 0.13
SaS 0.67 0 0.33 0 0.55
Slovenia PS 0.87 0 0.33 0 0.09
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Figure 1: Plot of cases’ membership in ~SURV against their membership in ~IMPR
Figure 2: Plot of cases’ membership in SURV against their membership in WEIGH+ROOT
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AGALEV
ECOLO
Table 4: Truth Table
Conditions No. Cases SURV ~SURV
Row weigh impr coh root outc. consist. PRI outc. consist PRI
1. 1 1 1 1 1 SV 1 1.000 1 0 0.543 0
2. 1 1 1 0 1 JL 1 0.921 0.813 0 0.657 0.187
3. 0 1 1 1 5 Agalev, Ecolo, VIHR, Verts, Grüne 1 0.882 0.791 0 0.523 0.155
4. 0 0 1 1 1 Green 0 0.863 0.691 0 0.676 0.272
5. 1 0 0 1 1 FPÖ 0 0.842 0.634 0 0.705 0.317
6. 1 0 1 0 1 GERB 0 0.838 0.564 0 0.790 0.436
7. 0 0 0 1 3 Verdi, PRC, SO 0 0.754 0.604 1 0.626 0.396
8. 1 0 0 0 8 NDSV, VV, RP, NS, DP, LPF, SaS, PS 0 0.516 0.219 1 0.821 0.711
9. 0 0 0 0 4 JP. TPP, SOP, ANO 0 0.302 0 1 1.000 1
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Table 5: Paths implying SURV
IMPR * COH * WEIGH IMPR * COH * ROOT
Consistency 0.963918 0.898876
Raw Coverage 0.333631 0.428189
Unique Coverage 0.146298 0.240856
Covered Cases* JL (0.67, 0.79);
SV (0.65, 0.8)
VIHR (0.67, 1);
Verts (0.67, 0.76);  
Grüne (0.67, 1);
SV (0.67, 0.8)
Contradictory cases** Agalev (0.67, 0.35);
Ecolo (0.67, 0.45)
Solution Consistency 0.904494
Solution Coverage 0.574487
*Cases with membership in configuration and outcome > 0.5. The values correspond to the cases’
scores in the configuration and outcome, respectively. 
**Cases with membership in configuration > 0.5 and outcome < 0.5.
Table 6: Paths implying ~SURV
~IMPR * ~COH * ~ROOT      ~IMPR * ~COH * ~WEIGH
Consistency 0.866453 0.825700
Raw Coverage 0.588107 0.470631
Unique Coverage 0.283539 0.166062
Covered Cases* VV (1, 1); TPP (1, 1); JP (0.67, 1);
NS (0.67, 0.63); DP (0.67, 0.7);
LPF (0.67, 0.69); SOP (0.67, 1);
ANO (0.67, 0.87); PS (0.67, 0.91)
TPP (0.8, 1); PRC (0.67, 0.67);
JP (0.67, 1); SO (0.67, 0.89); 
SOP (0.67, 1), ANO (0.55, 0.87)
Contradictory cases** NDSV (0.67, 0.47);
RP (0.67, 0.18); SaS (0.67, 0.45)
Verdi (0.67, 0.09)
Solution Consistency 0.798771
Solution Coverage 0.754170
*Cases with membership in configuration and outcome > 0.5. The values correspond to the cases’
scores in the configuration and outcome, respectively. 
**Cases with membership in configuration > 0.5 and outcome < 0.5.
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